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Abstract 
This study investigates whether the market valuation of the two summary accounting 
measures, book value of equity and net income, is higher (lower) for the financial institutions 
positively (negatively) rated by the Moddy’s and/or by the Standard and Poor’s, when 
compared to financial institutions that are not rated by these credit rating agencies. Findings 
suggest that positive ratings have an impact in valuation both in developed and emerging 
countries, and that in the case of emerging countries negative ratings do not impact market 
valuation significantly. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that credit ratings are 
useful in reducing value uncertainty of the issuing firms and in mitigating information 
asymmetry in capital markets. 





















Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are organizations that provide opinions on the 
creditworthiness of entities and their financial obligations and a credit rating is a CRA’s 
assessment of the quality of the debt issuer or a specific debt obligation (Frost, 2007). The 
credit rating industry emerged in the United States (US) in the early 1900s and became a 
crucial part of financial markets (Jeon and Lovo, 2013). Nowadays, there is a high level of 
concentration in the credit rating agencies. Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Ficht control over 
90 percent of the market share (Jeon and Lovo, 2013). Together, Moody’s and S&P are 
typically seen as a duopoly or partner-monopoly (Rhee, 2014). In view of this dominance, we 
focus on these two agencies, similar to some prior studies (e.g. Li et al., 2006; Han et al., 
2009). 
Two crucial roles in capital markets are usually attributed to CRAs (Frost, 2007; 
Chung et al., 2012). First, a role as information suppliers, by gathering and analyzing 
information relevant for the assessment of credit quality and making the results of these 
activities available to market participants. Second, a role in the facilitation of contracting, 
because their letter ratings are viewed as efficient credit quality benchmarks.  
Credit ratings also play a significant role in managers’ decision making. There is 
survey evidence suggesting that credit ratings are a key objective for CFOs in the USA, being 
only surpassed by financial flexibility in terms of influence on capital structure decisions 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001). There is also evidence that managers from other countries 
attribute great importance to credit ratings, albeit less than their counterparts from the USA 
(Beattie et al, 2010; Brounen et al., 2004). Better credit ratings allow firms to have better capital 
market access, not only in terms of the cost of borrowing but also regarding the amount of debt 
issued, and this has a significant impact on their real outcomes (Tang, 2009). 
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Given the unique features of the banking industry, namely its role in financial 
intermediation and importance for financial stability (Packer and Tarashev, 2011), rating 
changes are likely to impact differently financial and non-financial firms (Hubler et al., 2014). 
This is why some authors focus on the financial sector (Gropp and Richards, 2001) or 
discriminate in the analysis the reactions observed for it (Abad-Romero and Robles-
Fernandez, 2006; Hubler et al., 2014). For those same reasons, we adopt the former approach 
and focus on the financial sector. 
Relying on the accounting based valuation model developed in Ohlson (1995), this 
study investigates whether the market valuation of book value and net income is higher (lower) 
for the financial institutions rated positively (negatively) by at least one of the major credit rating 
agencies (Moddy’s and Standard and Poor’s), when compared to those financial institutions 
that are not rated by these credit rating agencies. The empirical analysis relies on the financial 
institutions (SIC code 6) of countries that have already adopted IFRS and for which 2012 and 
2013 accounting and market information is available in the Thomson Worldscope Database.  
Our study adds to the literature by investigating the value relevance of credit ratings. 
As far as we are aware, our study is the first to undertake this type of analysis. Given the 
scarcity of research pertaining to emerging countries (Han et al., 2009), we also compare the 
results obtained for financial institutions based in emerging countries with the results obtained 
for their counterparts from developed countries. The findings suggest that positive ratings have 
a positive impact in the market valuation of net income both in developed and emerging 
countries, and that in the case of emerging countries negative ratings do not impact market 
valuation significantly. 
This study contributes to two streams of literature. First, it contributes to the literature 
on the valuation relevance of non-financial information, which widely concurs in establishing 
the link between the market value of equity and such type of information (e.g. Rajgopal et al., 
2003; Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2008; Berthelot et al., 2012; Lourenço et al., 2014). We extend 
these conclusions to the issue of credit ratings. Second, it contributes to the literature on the 
capital market impact of credit ratings. Despite a wealth of literature documenting the impact 
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of credit ratings on these markets (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; 
An and Chang, 2008; Chan and Lo, 2011; Leventis et al., 2014), we revisit the question by 
examining their valuation relevance.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypothesis 
to be tested based on a literature review. Section 3 describes the research design and section 
4 analyses the empirical results. Finally, section 5 presents the summary and concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses 
Leventis et al. (2014) summarize the results of studies on the impact of credit ratings 
on the debt market, by suggesting that CRAs impact this market in the following ways: certify 
the quality of the borrower; influence the cost of debt; lessen credit constraints, thus enabling 
rated firms to raise more financial resources; influence managers’ decisions pertaining to 
corporate capital structure; and increase the magnitude of syndicated loans, thereby enabling 
firms to finance new investments and acquisitions. They suggest that credit ratings play a 
similar role in equity markets for two reasons: they consider all publicly available information; 
and they convey relevant private information that is not available to analysts. Examples of this 
private information include the possibility of firms communicating sensitive information to 
investors through confidential discussions with CRAs (Chou, 2013) and the possibility of these 
agencies incorporating private information into their assessments without revealing specific 
details (Chou, 2013; An and Chan, 2008). Additionally one has to consider the possibility of 
CRAs holding some information that is not in the public domain, especially on intangible assets 
of a firm (Hubler et al., 2014).  
If credit ratings do convey relevant private information, they play an important role in 
mitigating information asymmetry and rating change announcements should provide 
incremental information to the market. The numerous studies on the information content of 
credit ratings confirm this much, in particular in the case of downgrades.  
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Most evidence comes from non-United States (US) markets (Matolcsy and Lianto, 
1995; Choy et al., 2006; Barron et al., 1997; Elayan et al., 2001; Abad-Romero and Robles-
Fernández, 2007; Poon and Chang, 2008; Murcia et al., 2013). In spite of some variation in 
the results of these studies, findings suggest that the market reaction is stronger whereas its 
reaction to upgrades does not exist or is weaker. Unlike US, UK and Australian studies, that 
find significant reactions to only bad news, studies analyzing smaller markets, such as the New 
Zealand (Elayan et al., 2001), the Spanish (Abad-Romero and Robles-Fernández, 2007) and 
the Brazilian markets (Murcia et al., 2013), find also positive and statistically significant market 
reactions to rating upgrades. 
There is also evidence of the role of corporate credit ratings on initial public offerings 
(IPO) pricing (An and Chang, 2008; Chan and Lo, 2011), on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) 
(Poon et al., 2013) and on the information content of the earnings announcements (Leventis 
et al., 2014). An and Chang (2008) and Chan and Lo (2011) found that when firms go public, 
those with credit ratings are underpriced significantly less relative to companies without credit 
ratings. Poon et al. (2013) provide similar findings for SEO firms. These authors conclude that 
credit ratings are useful in reducing value uncertainty of the issuing firms and in mitigating 
information asymmetry in the IPO and SEO markets. Leventis et al. (2014) found that the level 
of credit quality enhances the value relevance of earnings announcements, especially when 
these contain positive earnings news and are released on a more timely basis.  
Our study adds to this literature by investigating the value relevance of credit ratings 
relying on the accounting based valuation model developed in Ohlson (1995). Early value 
relevance research focused on financial information. It examined the association between 
accounting amounts and equity market values and accounting amount was defined as value 
relevant if it had a statistically significant association with equity market values (Barth et al., 
2001). However, the increasing gap between the firms’ equity market values and the 
corresponding accounting data has ushered researchers to study the value relevance of non-
financial information (Carnevale et al., 2012). In this context, information is defined as value-
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relevant if it is significantly related to investors’ valuation of a firm as reflected in a financial 
measure of its value such as the firm’s stock price (Wyatt, 2008).  
The general conclusion emerging from research on the value relevance of non-
financial information is that accounting information by itself is not able to fully explain equity 
market values and their variations. The literature on the valuation relevance of non-financial 
information widely concurs in establishing the link between the market value of equity and such 
type of information (Amir and Lev, 1996; Rajgopal et al., 2003; Johnston et al., 2008; Matolcsy 
and Wyatt, 2008; Berthelot et al., 2012; Carnevale et al., 2012; Sievers et al., 2013; Carnevale 
and Mazzuca, 2014; Lourenço et al., 2014; Clarkson et al., 2015). 
Based upon the above discussion our hypotheses are stated as follows:  
H1: the market valuation of book value and net income will be higher for the financial 
institutions rated positively by at least one of the major credit rating agencies (Moddy’s and 
Standard and Poor’s) relative to their counterparts.  
H2: the market valuation of book value and net income will be lower for the financial 
institutions rated negatively by at least one of the major credit rating agencies (Moddy’s and 
Standard and Poor’s) relative to their counterparts.  
 
3. Research design 
3.1.  Sample and data 
The empirical analysis relies on the financial institutions (SIC code 6) of countries that 
have already adopted IFRS and for which information is available in the Thomson Worldscope 
Database. Given the focus of the analysis, the value relevance of accounting information, and 
in order to guarantee the homogeneity of the sample, we based our research on data included 
in a set financial statements prepared according to the same accounting standards, IFRS. 
The financial institutions are classified into three groups, depending on whether they 
are rated positively, they are rated negatively or they are not at all rated by the major two 
CRAs, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. In view of the dominance achieved by these two 
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agencies (Jeon and Lovo, 2013; Rhee, 2014), numerous studies also focus on them (e.g. 
Chou, 2013; Li et al., 2006; Han et al., 2009; Murcia et al., 2013).  
Each financial institution is assigned to the group of financial institutions rated 
positively (negatively) when it was awarded a positive rating by both credit rating agencies or 
when it was only assessed by one of the agencies and it was awarded a positive (negative) 
rating. The few financial institutions that were rated positively by one of the agencies and rated 
negatively by the other one are thus excluded from the sample.  
The classification of the financial institutions in three groups based on their credit 
rating gives rise to the most important independent variables in our study, RAT_Pos and 
RAT_Neg.    
The empirical analysis relies on 2012 and 2013 accounting and market data. The 
information used to compute most variables was collected from the Thomson Worldscope 
Database. To ensure that the regression results are not unduly sensitive to extreme 
observations, we exclude observations that differ from the average more than three times the 
standard deviation. This approach is consistent with some other value relevance studies.  
The final sample is thus composed of 225 financial institution-year observations rated 
positively (RAT_Pos), 71 financial institution-year observations rated negatively (RAT_Neg), 
and 261 financial institution-year observation not rated by any of the two major credit rating 
agencies.  
Table 1 presents the sample distribution across countries, which are classified into 
two groups, developed and emerging countries, based on the IMF classification (Nielsen, 
2011).  
 
Table 1 here 
 
When all the countries are considered together, we find that 53% of the financial 
institutions are rated by at least one of the two major credit rating agencies. However, this 
percentage is slightly higher for financial institutions from the emerging countries when 
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compared to financial institutions from the group of developed countries (58% versus 50%). In 
the group of emerging countries, Brazil, Kuwait and South Africa stand out by its higher 
proportion of financial institutions that are rated by one of the two major credit rating agencies. 
In the group of developed countries, we highlight the role of Australia, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, and UK. 
When analyzing only those financial institutions that are rated by the Moddy’s or by 
the Standard and Poor’s, we find that 81% of the financial institutions from the developed 
countries are rated positively. In the group of financial institutions from the emerging countries 
this percentage decreases to 68%. 
 
3.2. Research method 
To test the hypotheses formulated in Section 3, we estimate several regressions 
based on the same model, which relies on the accounting based valuation model developed 
in Ohlson (1995), who shows how the firm value relates to accounting data and other 
information. This approach is currently used in several empirical studies on the value relevance 
of non-financial information (e.g. Rajgopal et al., 2003; Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2008; Johnston et 
al., 2008; Sinkin et al., 2008; Lourenço et. al., 2014; Clarkson et al., 2015). Our primary model 
shows that the market value of equity is a function of two summary measures of information 
reflected in financial statements, namely the book value of equity and earnings, given by 
equation (1). 
 
itititit  INVBVM εααα +++= 210      (1) 
 
where MV is the market value of equity1, BV represents the book value of equity and 
NI is the net operating income. All the variables are on a per share basis.  
                                                          
 
 
1 We use the market value of equity as of fiscal year-end. However, untabulated findings reveal that our inferences are not 
sensitive to using prices as of fiscal year-end or as of three months after fiscal year-end. 
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In order to investigate whether the market valuation of book value and net income is 
higher (lower) for the financial institutions rated positively (negatively) by at least one of the 
major credit rating agencies (Moddy’s or Standard and Poor’s), when compared to those 
financial institutions that are not rated by any of these agencies, we use a new estimating 
equation, equation (2), which allows the coefficients of the variables BV and NI to vary 
according to whether the financial institution has been rated positively (negatively) and is given 
by  
 
  (2) 
 
where RAT_Pos (RAT_Neg) is a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the 
financial institution is rated positively (negatively) by at least one of the major credit rating 
agencies (Moddy’s or Standard and Poor’s) and 0 if the financial institution had not been rated.  
We classify a financial institution as being rated positively by the Moddy’s when its 
rating is Aaa (judged to be of the highest quality, subject to the lowest level of credit risk), Aa 
(judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk) or A (judged to be upper-
medium grade and are subject to low credit risk).  
The remaining ratings are classified as negative, including: Baa (judged to be 
medium-grade and subject to moderate credit risk and as such may possess certain 
speculative characteristics), Ba (judged to be speculative and subject to substantial credit risk), 
B (judged to be speculative and subject to high credit risk), Caa (judged to be speculative of 
poor standing and subject to very high credit risk), Ca (highly speculative and likely in, or very 
near, default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest) and C (typically in 
default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest). 
We classify a financial institution as being rated positively by the Standard and Poor’s 
when its rating is AAA (the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation 
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is extremely strong), AA (the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the 
obligation is very strong), A (the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the 
obligation is still strong), BBB (exhibits adequate protection parameters). The remaining ratings 
are classified as negative, including: BB, B, CCC, CC and C, which are regarded as having 
significant speculative characteristics. 
Following prior literature, some variables are used in this study to control for financial 
institution-level and country-level characteristics. We control for financial institution’s size, 
profitability, leverage, ownership concentration, auditor and cross-listing, which gives rise to 
seven financial institution-level variables, SIZE (natural logarithm of total assets as of the end 
of the year), ROE (return on equity), LEV (end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year 
total assets), OWN (percentage of closely-held shares), AUD (an indicator that assumes 1 if 
the financial institution is audited by a Big-4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise) and ADR (an indicator 
that assumes 1 if the financial institution is cross-listed in the US, and 0 otherwise). We also 
use three country-level variables: EMERGING (an indicator that assumes 1 if the country is 
classified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an emerging country, and 0 if it is 
classified as a developed country) (Nielsen, 2011), INV_P (an indicator of the level of investor 
protection in each country) and GDP (the percentage of GDP growth). 
Our predictions are as follows. If the market values the summary accounting 
measures differently for the financial institutions rated positively (negatively) by at least one of 
the major credit rating agencies, when compared to those financial institutions not are not 
rated, then the estimates for the coefficients of the interaction term of RAT_Pos (RAT_Neg) 
with BV and with NI should be statistically significant. If the market valuation of book value and 
net income is higher (lower) for the financial institutions rated positively (negatively), then we 
expect that 04 >α  and 05 >α  ( and ). 
We also compare the results obtained for financial institutions based in emerging 
countries with the results obtained for their counterparts from developed countries. We split 
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the sample into two sub-groups of financial institutions (from emerging vs developed countries) 
and we estimate Equation (2) separately for each of them.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample as well as for three 
sub-samples of 225 financial institution-year observations rated positively (RAT_Pos), 71 
financial institution-year observations rated negatively (RAT_Neg), and 261 financial 
institution-year observation not rated by any of the two major credit rating agencies. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
When comparing the sub-group of financial institutions rated positively with the sub-
group of financial institutions not rated, we find that for all the variables (except OWN) medians 
are higher for the group of positively rated financial institutions. Untabulated results for the 
equality of means parametric t-test show that the mean values are statistically different for all 
the variables, except Price, BV, NI and INV_P.     
When comparing the sub-group of financial institutions rated negatively with the sub-
group of financial institutions not rated, we find that for all the variables (except SIZE and ROE) 
medians are lower for the group of negatively rated financial institutions. Untabulated results 
for the equality of means parametric t-test show that the mean values are statistically different 
for all the variables, except INV_P and GDP.     
Table 3 shows correlations for the continuous variables included in the regression 
equations (due to its discrete nature and limited range, we did not include dummy variables in 
the Pearson correlation analysis). Consistent with established results in the accounting 
literature, the market value of equity is positively and statistically related with BV, NI and SIZE. 
The independent continuous variables included in the regressions, whilst showing some 
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indications of collinearity, have no pairwise correlation coefficients in excess of 0.80, indicating 
that the threat of multicollinearity is limited.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
4.2. Regression results 
Table 4 presents regression statistics resulting from the OLS estimation of Equation 
(2).  The regression considered in the first column (C1) includes all the financial institutions, 
while in the other two columns only financial institutions from developed (C2) and emerging 
(C3) countries are considered. In all the columns, the coefficients estimates for the accounting 
summary measures are statistically significant and they have the expected sign, i.e., the BV 
and NI coefficients estimates are both positive.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
Regarding the regression for all the financial institutions considered together (C1), the 
findings indicate that the market values differently the net income of financial institutions rated 
by a major credit rating agency. When we permit the coefficients of BV and NI to depend on 
the type of financial institution in terms of ratings, the results indicate that the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term of RAT_Pos (RAT_neg) with NI is positive (negative) and 
statistically significant, which means that on average the net income of financial institutions 
rated positively (negatively) by a major credit rating agency has a higher (lower) valuation by 
the market.  
We find supporting evidence for the two hypotheses presented above. There is a 
statistically significant negative valuation by the market of financial institutions with negative 
ratings and a positive valuation of similar institutions with positive ratings. This is not entirely 
in accordance with the findings of the majority of studies on the information content of credit 
ratings (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Cornell et al., 1989; Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 
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1992; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Barron et al., 1997; Ederington and Goh, 1998; Dichev and 
Piotroski, 2001; Jorion et al., 2005; Matolcsy and Lianto, 2005; Choy et al., 2006; Poon and 
Chang, 2008; Chou, 2013), which suggest that only bad news have an impact on the market.  
In this respect, our findings are consistent with those of Elayan et al. (2003) and Abad-
Romero and Robles-Fernández (2007), who find that the New Zealand and Spanish stock 
markets, respectively, react significantly to both negative and positive announcements. These 
authors conclude that small markets, such as the case of the Spanish and the New Zealand 
markets, behave in a different way than large markets. Investors in these small markets are 
found to have higher sensitivity to good news than those in larger markets like the U.S., U.K., 
and Australia. Elayan et al. (2003) conclude that credit ratings assume greater importance or 
are more valuable to the interested parties in small markets.  Our sample does not include 
firms from the largest market, the North American, and includes firms from many small 
markets, such as the case of the Spanish, the Portuguese, or the Israeli, in the case of 
developed economies, and the majority of the markets from emerging economies. Thus, our 
finds offer some sort of corroboration to the findings of these researches on small markets.   
However, it may be the case that the reasoning presented above is not true for all 
small markets. For example, Afik et al. (2014) analyze the case of the Israeli market and find 
that except for downgrades in 2008-2009 the rating announcements have no information value. 
They conclude that the market internalizes most of the information prior to the rating 
announcements. This may be explained by the characteristics of the market, which include the 
existence of a dominant banking system, “being highly centralized, and highly influenced by 
control pyramids” (Afik et al., 2014, p. 67). Moreover, it is “a home biased investment sentiment 
and the culture is of a small market (“everybody knows everybody else”)” (ibid.).  
Our findings suggest that in the case of emerging markets the picture is more or less 
similar to that of the Israeli market. Our findings for financial institutions from developed 
countries are consistent with those found for all the financial institutions considered together 
(Table 4). However, when the emerging countries are analyzed separately (Table 4), only 
positive ratings affect the market valuation of accounting numbers. It seems that, in these 
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countries, a negative rating is not so penalized by the market. It seems that, similar to what 
happens in the case of the Israeli market, which, given its characteristics, may be more similar 
to those of emerging economies that to those of more developed economies, “the relative 
advantage of rating agencies, stemming from their access to private and internal client 
information, might diminish” (Afik et al., 2014, p. 67). 
 
5. Conclusions  
Our results provide evidence that the market values differently the net income of 
financial institutions rated by a major credit rating agency. Our results support the view that 
accounting measures alone have only a limited ability to communicate a firm’s value to 
investors. They are consistent with those of studies on the capital market effects of credit 
ratings (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Dichev and Piotroski, 
2001; Matolcsy and Lianto, 2005; An and Chang, 2008; Chan and Lo, 2011; Chou, 2013; Poon 
et al., 2013; Leventis et al., 2014). They are also consistent with the idea that credit ratings are 
useful in reducing value uncertainty of the issuing firms and in mitigating information 
asymmetry in capital markets (An and Chang, 2008; Chan and Lo, 2011; Poon et al., 2013). 
Our findings are consistent with those of previous literature on the value relevance of 
other non-financial information unrelated to credit ratings (Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2008; Rajgopal 
et al., 2003; Lourenço et al., 2014, Clarkson et al., 2015). We extend their conclusions to the 
issue of credit ratings. We find that the market values differently the net income of financial 
institutions rated by a major credit rating agency, both in the case of positive ratings and in the 
case of negative ratings. This is not entirely consistent with most of the information content 
literature that finds that only bad news have an impact on the market (e.g. Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1986; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Matolcsy and Lianto, 
2005; Choy et al., 2006). We find that positive ratings have an impact in valuation both in 
developed and emerging countries, and that in the case of emerging countries negative ratings 
do not impact market valuation significantly. This study provides evidence that small markets 
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benefit from the certification provided by international CRA and that these agencies provide 
valuable information to investors in such markets.  
This study is not without limitations. First, our sample includes only financial 
institutions that are listed on a stock exchange, because of data availability. Second, it includes 
only financial institutions from countries that have already adopted IFRS. This means that 
banks from the United States, which are very important in the context of the global economy, 
are not included in the sample because this country has not yet adopted IFRS. Future research 
could address these limitations.  
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 RAT_Pos RAT_Neg No_Rat All firms 
Developed Countries     
   Australia 16 0 2 18 
   Austria 4 0 10 14 
   Belgium 0 0 2 2 
   Canada 12 0 8 20 
   Cyprus 0 4 2 6 
   Denmark 4 0 34 38 
   Germany 8 0 20 28 
   Finland 4 0 2 6 
   France 18 0 19 37 
   Greece 0 8 4 12 
   Ireland 0 2 0 2 
   Israel 10 0 6 16 
   Italy 6 8 16 30 
   Korea 8 0 6 14 
   Luxemburg 0 0 2 2 
   Netherlands 4 0 0 4 
   Norway 16 0 28 44 
   Portugal 0 4 2 6 
   Spain 4 5 2 11 
   Sweden 8 0 0 8 
   Switzerland 12 0 8 20 
   UK 10 2 2 14 
    144 33 175 352 
Emerging Countries     
   Brazil 20 12 4 36 
   Chile 8 0 6 14 
   Croacia 0 0 4 4 
   Kuwait 16 0 4 20 
   Oman 4 0 8 12 
   Poland 13 4 14 31 
   Philipines 6 6 16 28 
   Russia 0 12 12 24 
   South Africa 6 2 4 12 
   Turquey 8 2 14 24 
    81 38 86 205 
All Countries 225 71 261  557 
     
Column RAT_Pos includes the number of firms rated positively by the Moddy’s or by the Standard and Poor’s. Column RAT_Neg includes 
the number of firms rated negatively by the Moddy’s or by the Standard and Poor’s; Column No_RAT includes the number of firms not rated 







 Mean Median SD 
All Firms (n = 557)    
   MV 14.354 6.524 19.789 
   BV 23.385 7.005 50.944 
   NI 1.335 0.477 3.254 
   SIZE 16.487 16.440 2.311 
   ROE 0.116 0.077 1.606 
   LEV 0.904 0.920 0.088 
   OWN 0.412 0.354 0.328 
   INV_P 6.276 6.300 0.808 
   GDP 1.630 1.670 2.647 
   AUD 0.901 - - 
   ADR 0.145 - - 
Firms rated positively (n = 225)    
   MV 17.547 9.305 21.842 
   BV 23.329 8.665 48.935 
   NI 1.659 0.759 3.212 
   SIZE 17.908 17.518 1.896 
   ROE 0.089 0.090 0.073 
   LEV 0.918 0.929 0.061 
   OWN 0.367 0.257 0.323 
   INV_P 6.366 6.300 0.738 
   GDP 2.274 1.920 2.405 
   AUD 0.947 - - 
   ADR 0.240 - - 
Firms rated negatively (n = 71)    
   MV 3.553 1.462 5.315 
   BV 3.918 1.389 10.221 
   NI -0.387 0.050 3.090 
   SIZE 16.679 16.431 1.606 
   ROE 0.440 0.070 4.503 
   LEV 0.905 0.908 0.065 
   OWN 0.382 0.340 0.320 
   INV_P 6.023 6.300 0.853 
   GDP 0.509 1.320 3.150 
   AUD 0.958 - - 
   ADR 0.254 - - 
Firms not rated (n = 261)    
   MV 14.539 7.030 19.445 
   BV 28.728 8.659 57.677 
   NI 1.524 0.426 3.201 
   SIZE 15.209 15.282 2.055 
   ROE 0.050 0.067 0.146 
   LEV 0.891 0.913 0.108 
   OWN 0.458 0.420 0.329 
   INV_P 6.268 6.700 0.840 
   GDP 1.380 0.650 15.282 
   AUD 0.847 - - 
   ADR 0.034 - - 
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MV is the market price at the fiscal year-end; BV is the book value of equity as of the end of the year; NI is the net income of the year; SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets as of the end of the year; ROE is the return on equity; LEV is end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-
of-year market capitalization; OWN is percentage of closely held shares as disclosed in the Worldscope database; AUD is an indicator that 
assumes 1 if the firm is audited by a Big-4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise; ADR is an indicator that assumes 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US, 
and 0 otherwise; INV_P is an indicator of the level of investor protection in each country, where a higher value means a lower level of investor 









 MV BV NI SIZE ROE LEV OWN INV_P 
   MV 1 - - - - - - - 
   BV 0.754*** 1 - - - - - - 
   NI 0.793*** 0.814*** 1 - - - - - 
   SIZE 0.129*** 0.009 0.025 1 - - - - 
   ROE -0.013 -0.017 -0.013 -0.022 1 - - - 
   LEV 0.075* 0.013 -0.015 0.475*** 0.037 1 - - 
   OWN -0.051 -0.079* -0.025 -0.184*** -0.012 -0.096** 1 - 
   INV_P 0.180*** 0.165*** 0.185*** 0.088** -0.041 0.113*** -0.228*** 1 
   GDP -0.190*** -0.184*** -0.058 -0.081* -0.029 -0.191*** 0.169*** -0.394*** 
 
MV is the market price at the fiscal year-end; BV is the book value of equity as of the end of the year; NI is the net income of the year; SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets as of the end of the year; ROE is the return on equity; LEV is end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-
of-year market capitalization; OWN is the percentage of closely held shares as disclosed in the Worldscope database; INV_P is an indicator of 
the level of investor protection in each country, where a higher value means a lower level of investor protection; GDP is the percentage of GDP 
growth in each country. 
 










 All Countries Developed Countries Emerging Countries 
Intercept 11.413* 24.324** -0.160 
Main variables:    
   BV 0.085*** 0.077*** 0.322*** 
   NI 3.613*** 3.407*** 4.362*** 
   RAT_Pos 0.923 -2.796 2.102*** 
   RAT_Pos x BV -0.177*** -0.080* 0.351** 
   RAT_Pos x NI 3.374*** 2.038*** 2.890* 
   RAT_Neg -5.229*** -8.448*** -0.471 
   RAT_Neg x BV 0.214 0.211 -0.164 
   RAT_Neg x NI -3.511*** -3.925*** -0.440 
Firm-level Control variables:    
   SIZE 0.565** 0.967*** 0.092 
   ROE -0.076 -0.011 -7.611* 
   LEV -1.066 -3.345 -2.038 
   AUD -1.166 -2.343 0.778 
   ADR 0.841 -0.577 0.797 
   OWN 1.325 -0.759 0.634 
Country-level Control variables    
   EMERG -3.154** - - 
   INV_P -1.621*** -3.730*** 0.098 
   GDP -0.652*** 0.688 0.137 
    
Adjusted R2  0.739 0.736 0.922 
F-Value 93.836*** 62.137*** 152.252*** 
 
Dependent variable: MV (market price at the fiscal year-end).  
 
Independent firm-level variables: MV is the market price at the fiscal year-end; BV is the book value of equity as of the end of the year; NI is 
the net income of the year; RAT_Pos is a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the firm is rated positively by the Moddy’s or by the 
Standard and Poor’s, and 0 otherwise; RAT_Neg is a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the firm is rated negatively by the Moddy’s 
or by the Standard and Poor’s, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets as of the end of the year; ROE is the return on 
equity; LEV is end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year market capitalization; OWN is percentage of closely held shares as disclosed 
in the Worldscope database; AUD is an indicator that assumes 1 if the firm is audited by a Big-4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise; ADR is an indicator 
that assumes 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US, and 0 otherwise; OWN is the percentage of closely held shares as disclosed in the Worldscope 
database.  
 
Independent country-level variables: EMERG is a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the firm is from a country classified by the 
IMF as an emerging country and 0 if the firm is from a developed country; INV_P is an indicator of the level of investor protection in each 
country, where a higher value means a lower level of investor protection; GDP is the percentage of GDP growth in each country. 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
